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NOTES & COMMENTS
IDENTITY CRISIS: THE CHARTER AND FORENSIC DNA
ANALYSIS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
ROBERT E. ASTROFFt

Law, including criminal law, must in a free society be
judged ultimately on the basis of its success in promoting
human autonomy and the capacity for individual human
growth and development. The prevention of crime is an
essential aspect of the environmental protection required
if autonomy is to flourish. It is, however, a negative
aspect and one which, pursued with single-minded zeal,
may end up creating an environment in which all are safe
but none is free. I

As a result of several highly publicized criminal cases (most notably
the 0. J. Simpson double murder trial in California), a tremendous
amount of public attention has been focused on the subject of
genetic testing. DNA typing is a powerful investigative tool that can
help to identify or exonerate individuals who have been accused of
committing serious crimes. 2 Since its introduction in Canada in
1988, it has been instrumental in securing convictions in hundreds
of violent crimes, from homicide to sexual assault.3 Until recently,
however, there has been no legislative framework to regulate its use.
On July 13, 1995, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the
Young Offenders Act (forensic DNA analysis) 4 received Royal Assent
and its provisions are now in force. It represents the first attempt by
Parliament to provide legal authority for the compulsion of bodily
samples as a direct response to the development of genetic testing.

B.A. (McGill), LLB. anticipated 1997 (Dalhousie).
Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1968) at 65.
2 See e.g. R. v. Morin (1995), 37 C.R. (4th) 395.
3 House of Commons Debates (22 June 1995) at 14489.
4 S.C. 1995, c. 27.
t
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The legislation empowers law enforcement officers to seize a
bodily substance from an individual pursuant to a new type of
warrant. The seizure may take place without the person's consent,
when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a serious crime
has been committed by the individual from whom the DNA sample
will be taken. The effect of the law is to create a distinct code of
procedure, designed to both authorize and regulate the seizure of
DNA evidence from suspects in criminal cases. The legislation is
remarkable for the invasiveness of the procedure it permits.
The impact of forensic DNA analysis on criminal investigations
has been compared to that of traditional fingerprinting techniques
when first introduced in the early 1900s.5 Unlike conventional
fingerprinting, however, which identifies individuals on the basis of
minute physical characteristics, DNA typing looks for differences
which are far more intimate and go to the very essence of a person.
The advantages of DNA typing technology are unquestionable,
but society must also be mindful of the potential dangers it presents
to civil liberties. Forensic DNA analysis has innumerable "Orwellian
possibilities," 6 but the legal community seems to be focused on the
ability of the technology to identify criminal suspects. It is feared
that courts may lose all sense of balance and restraint in the face of
this novel scientific evidence, embracing it with little scrutiny of its
actual reliability and little concern for its impact on the rights of
individuals. As a consequence of the new legislation, Canadian
judges and lawyers will be forced to deal with the implications of
this technology.
DNA typing draws upon concepts in diverse scientific disciplines
such as forensics, molecular biology, population genetics and
statistics. In order to comprehend the legal issues involved in
forensic DNA analysis, one requires a basic understanding of human
genetics.7 These principles will be outlined in the first part of the
paper.
5 J.L. Marx, "DNA Fingerprinting Takes the Witness Stand" (1988) 240 Science
1616.
6 J.C. Hoeffel, ''The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence
Meets the Criminal Defendant" (1990) 42 Stan. L. Rev. 465 at 466.
7 See generally Science Council of Canada, Genetics in Health Care: Report 42
(Ottawa: Science Council of Canada, 1991) at 17-33, 99-105; Medical Research
Council of Canada, Guidelines for Research on Somatic Cell Gene Therapy in
Humans (Ottawa: Medical Research Council of Canada, 1990) at 11-23; Law
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The second part of the essay traces the historical development
of DNA testing from its introduction in England in 1988, to its
present-day use in Canada. This will provide the necessary
background for the analysis that follows.
The third part details the impact of the Constitution on the
forensic DNA provisions of the Criminal Code. It will be shown that
the new legislation, despite its laudable aims, infringes sections 7
and 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The analysis
will demonstrate that it is unlikely that the violations of these rights
can be saved by section 1. This will be followed by a discussion of
the potential impact of section 24(2) on the new legislation.
The paper concludes with an assessment of the constitutional
validity of DNA data banks. While the present law does not
authorize such a measure, it is clear that this is the legislative course
that has been charted by Parliament. It will be argued that the
establishment of a DNA data bank is inconsistent with the notions of
privacy, liberty and personal security that exist in Canadian society.

I. THE BLUEPRINT OF LIFE
The human body is made up of cells. 8 Nearly all of these cells
contain a nucleus and a cytoplasm. The nucleus contains two
important structures: chromosomes and nucleoli. In every human
cell there are 46 chromosomes, divided into 23 pairs. Each cell
contains 23 chromosomes from the father and 23 from the mother.
The chromosomes combine to form a genome, or genetic code.
Deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, has been described as the
"blueprint of all life;" it is the molecule that contains the genetic
code. DNA is present in the nuclei of all living cells with the
exception of red blood cells, 9 and can be extracted from any sample
containing nucleated cells. Io All the cells of an individual have the
Reform Commission of Canada, Human Dignity and Genetic Heritage: A Study
Paper (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1991) at 5-14; D. Suzuki,
Genethics: The Ethics ofEngineering Life (Don Mills: Stoddart, 1990).
8

The body of a human being has more than 10,000,000,000,000 cells.
Blood contains many cell types in addition to red blood cells, and it is from
these cells that DNA can be obtained when forensic evidence is a blood stain.
IO Hair shafts and fingernails are not made up of nucleated cells, and are
therefore unhelpful for DNA typing. Further, saliva and urine are not made up of
nucleated cells, but contain nucleated cells from the wall of the mouth and urethra
respectively.
9
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same DNA composition, which does not change during the course of
his or her lifetime. Although the DNA of different individuals varies
only slightly, 11 no two people, with the exception of identical twins,
have exactly the same DNA composition.
The structure of DNA was discovered in 19 5 3 by James
D. Watson and Francis H. C. Crick. It includes two long chains
linked together in the form of a double-stranded helix. In other
words, DNA looks like a twisted rope ladder, a double thread held
together by crosspieces and coiled like a spring.
An individual's genetic code is expressed by the arrangement of
six chemical compounds. The long threads that make up the sides
of the ladder contain alternating units of phosphate and a sugar
called deoxyribose. The rungs of the ladder are made up of four
bases called adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine (abbreviated
A, C, G, and T). Each rung consists of two bases: A-T, T-A, C-G,
or G-C. No other combination is possible because only the A-T and
C-G pairs are chemically attracted to each other. In addition, only
these pairs make rungs of the proper length to fit between the side
pieces of the ladder. Any other combination is too big or too small.
These base pairs are repeated millions of times in every cell and
their order determines the genetic characteristics of each
individual. 12 Present technology does not allow scientists to look at
the entire DNA chain contained in the 23 pairs of chromosomes of
the cell. In 1985, however, the British geneticist Dr. Alec Jeffreys
determined that by examining certain sections of these chemical
combinations, scientists could differentiate between individuals. 13
These sections of DNA are considered highly polymorphic, which is
to say they differ greatly among individuals. The significance for
forensics is that the larger the number of sites that match (between
an evidence sample and a known sample), the more likely it is that a
suspect is implicated in the crime. The other important point is that
a non-match at any polymorphic site absolutely excludes an
individual whose DNA profile is being compared.

11

99.9 per cent of the base pairs in human DNA are identical in all individuals.
In total, human DNA contains about 3.3 billion base pairs.
!3 A.J. Jeffreys, et al., "Individual-Specific Fingerprints of Human DNA" (1985)
316 Nature 316.
12
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II. GENETIC JURISPRUDENCE
The trial of Colin Pitchfork, which involved the sexual assault and
murder of two young girls, was the first criminal case to use
forensic DNA analysis. 14 The killings occurred in 1983 and 1986 in
neighbouring villages in Leicestershire, England. For the intervening
three years between the murders, the police had no leads, although
they believed that the same man was responsible for both crimes. A
month after the second murder, a youth, Richard Buckland, was
arrested and soon confessed to the 1986 killing, but he firmly
denied involvement in the 1983 murder.
Forensic DNA analysis was performed on samples of Buckland's
blood and from the semen samples found on the victims. The
results were discouraging to the police; while it was clear that the
same individual had sexually assaulted the two victims, it was
equally certain that the culprit was not Buckland. Thus, genetic
testing freed an innocent man who would almost certainly have
been convicted on the ground of a false confession.
Richard Buckland was released after three months in custody.
He claimed that intense pressure and intimidation by the
investigating officers had caused him to confess falsely, but an
internal police investigation disclosed no improper conduct.
At this point, the police took an extraordinary step: using
hospital and voting records, they compiled a list of all the males
between the ages of 13 and 30 living in the adjoining villages of
Narborough, Enderby and Litdethorpe. A letter was then sent to
over 5,000 men, requesting their attendance to provide a blood
sample for the purposes of forensic DNA analysis.
Several thousand blood samples were collected, but failed to
provide a single match. 15 One individual, Colin Pitchfork, failed to
arrive at the first two appointments made for him, but he
apparently co-operated on the third visit. The case was eventually
resolved when it was learned that Pitchfork had convinced a coworker to submit a blood sample in his place. A sample of
Pitchfork's blood resulted in a DNA profile, identical to that
produced by the semen specimens. Pitchfork pleaded guilty to
14

See generally The [London] Times (23 January 1988); and G. Greg Brodsky,
The Technology of the Future is Here" (1993) 36 Cr. L.Q. 10.
l5 Over 97 per cent of the men responded to the first letter; the remainder were
eventually found and voluntarily gave blood.
"DNA:
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both counts of sexual assault and murder and was sentenced to life
imprisonment.
The celebrated American decision of People v. Castro 16 was the
first case to thoroughly examine the methodology and results of
forensic DNA analysis. The defendant, Jose Castro, was accused of
murdering his neighbour, Vilna Ponce, and her two-year-old
daughter in their Bronx apartment building. The police seized
Castro's wristwatch, and determined that the small bloodstain
found on it matched the DNA of one of the victims. Although the
DNA evidence was held to be inadmissible due to the alleged use of
a contaminated probe, this case is seen as giving "a sweeping
endorsement of DNA typing as a potentially revolutionary tool in
criminal law enforcement." 17
The case of R. v. Parent introduced DNA evidence to Canadian
jurisprudence in 1988. 18 The accused was charged with eleven
counts of sexual assault and breaking and entering. During the
investigation, several articles of the victims' clothing and samples of
the accused's hair and blood were collected and compared by a
private laboratory. The test results, obtained during the course of
the trial, exculpated Parent in four of the sexual assaults. The court
held that other factors eliminated Parent as the offender in three
other counts. Having been eliminated from a total of seven of the
eleven counts, Roslak J. concluded that reasonable doubt existed as
to whether Parent was the assailant in the remaining offences.
DNA evidence was next examined by a Canadian court in the
1989 decision of R. v. McNa!ly. 19 The case involved a man charged
with sexual assault and identified in a photo line-up. Following a
voir dire, Flanigan D.C.J. allowed the RCMP's DNA typing results.
This marked the first time in North America that DNA evidence,
obtained by a law enforcement agency, was admitted in court. 20
The accused changed his plea to guilty after the DNA evidence was
admitted.

16

545 N.Y.S. 2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
J.G. Petrosinelli, "The Admissibility of DNA Typing: A New Methodology"
(1990-91) 79 Georgetown L.J. 313 at 326.
18 (1988), Alta. L.R. (2d) 18 (Alta. QB.).
l9 (5 April 1989), Ottawa-Carleton 3751 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
20 B.D. Gaudette, DNA Typing: A New Service to Canadian Police (1990), 52:4
RCMP Gazette 1.
l7
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In 1990, the Ontario General Division considered the
admissibility of DNA evidence in the case of R. v. Keenan and
Hunt. 21 Misener]. ruled that the results of DNA testing, performed
by the RCMP, were admissible. The defendants maintained their
innocence, despite the evidence against them, and were convicted at
trial.
Forensic DNA analysis was subsequently used in the trial of
Claude Bourguignon in 1991. 22 The accused was charged with the
sodomy and murder of his young nephew. Unlike the situation in
McNally 2 3 and Keenan and Hunt, 24 which dealt solely with the
admissibility of genetic evidence; in this case an expert witness was
called on to testify as to the statistical probability of a coincidental
match. The court admitted the evidence, but excluded the expert
testimony. The comments of Flanigan ]. are noteworthy:
This court does not think that the criminal jurisdiction of
Canada is yet ready to put such an additional pressure on
a jury, by making them overcome such fantastic odds
and asking them to weigh it as just one piece of evidence
to be considered in the overall picture of the evidence
presented. 25

The court went on to find that there was a real danger that the
jury would use the evidence as the sole measure of the accused's
guilt or innocence and thereby undermine the presumption of
innocence and erode the standard of reasonable doubt. 26
Evidence obtained by means of genetic testing was introduced
in the trial of Carlos T erceira, accused of the murder of a six-yearold girl. 27 Following a voir dire, Silverman]. held that "evidence as

21

(11December1990), (Ont. Gen. Div.) [unreported].

22

R. v. Bourguignon (14 January 1991), (Ont. Gen. Div.) [unreported]; see also H.

Levy, "The DNA Debate" Canadian Lawyer (14 September 1991).
23 Supra note 19.
24 Supra note 21.
25 Supra note 22. It should be noted that other courts have rejected the distinction
drawn by Flanigan J. and have admitted both DNA evidence and evidence regarding
the statistical probabiliry of a match. See e.g. R. v. Lafferty (1993), 80 C.C.C. (3d)
150. SopinkaJ. alluded to this debate in R. v. Mohan (1994), 29 C.R. (4th) 243 at
253; however, the issue was not ultimately resolved as the specific point was not
raised in the case.
26

Ibid.

27 R.

v. Terceira (23 October 1991), (Ont. Gen. Div.) [unreported].
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to the· methodology and techniques" could be presented to the
jury, but "evidence as to statistics, human or population genetics,
and probabilities" should be excluded on the basis that there was
"serious debate and controversy among the leading thinkers and
experts in the field."28
In the 1992 case of R. v. ]ohnston, 2 9 the Ontario General
Division stated that two distinct branches of science were involved
in DNA profiling: molecular biology and population genetics. Due
to the complex interrelationship between the two disciplines,
Langdon J. noted that "one must exercise extreme caution in areas
where the different disciplines interface." 30 Due to the fact that a
trial court possesses the residual discretion to reject evidence, the
court held that where the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative
value, the court can and should exclude the evidence.
DNA typing evidence was critical in the trial and subsequent
appeal of Allan Legere, charged with four murders in the Miramichi
region of northern New Brunswick. 31 Prior to the trial, the RCMP
stated that this would be "a test case for new forensic crime-testing
procedures."3 2 Although Legere pleaded not guilty to all the
killings, the jury found him guilty of four counts of first-degree
murder.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
1. Section 8

Section 8 of the Charter provides:
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure. 33

28 Ibid.

69 c.c.c. (3d) 395.
Ibid. at 402.
3I R. v. Legere (1994), 95 C.C.C. (3d) 139 (N.B.C.A.); leave to appeal refd [1995]
S.C.C. Bulletin of Proceedings, 10 November 1995, 1795.
3 2 K. Cox, "Legere Charged With Four Murders" The Globe and Mail (21
November 1990).
3 3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11, s. 8 [hereinafter the
Charter].
29

30
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In examining the potential impact of section 8 on the forensic
DNA provisions of the Criminal Code, it is necessary to assess the
power to search and seize prior to the new legislation.
The Canadian criminal justice system is comprised of an
interconnected web of values and assumptions that define the role
of the individual, the role of the state, and the relationship between
the two. Implicit in this web of principles is the conviction that the
need for law enforcement must coexist with other concerns. Chief
among these concerns is the privacy of the individual.
In Hunter v. Southam Inc., 34 Dickson J. (as he then was), on
behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada, established that
the proper approach of the courts to the interpretation of the
Charter should be one that is both broad and purposive.35 The
Court went on to hold that the guarantee against unreasonable
search or seizure protected a "reasonable expectation of privacy."36
In the subsequent case of R. v. Dyment, 37 the Supreme Court of
Canada further expanded the privacy interest as follows:
Society has come to realize that privacy is at the heart of
liberty in a modern state ... Grounded in man's physical
and moral autonomy, privacy is essential for the wellbeing of the individual. For this reason alone, it is worthy
of constitutional protection, but it also has profound
significance for the public order. The restraints imposed
on government from prying into the lives of the citizen
go to the essence of the democratic state. 38

In order to ascertain the extent of an individual's right to be
secure against unreasonable search or seizure, a court must
undertake a delicate balancing process. Section 8 mandates that a
court weigh the public's interest in being free from government
interference against the state's interest in intruding on an
individual's privacy in order to advance its goals, notably those of

34

(1984), 14

c.c.c. (3d) 97.

35 Ibid. at 105-106.
3 6 Ibid. at 108.

c.c.c. (3d) 244.

37

(1988) 45

38

Ibid. at 254.
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law enforcement.39 Determining at what point privacy must give
way to official state intrusion is at the very crux of the analysis.
The unique informational aspect of DNA profiling4° adds a new
dimension to a section 8 examination of reasonableness in search
and seizures. The balancing test for the reasonableness of such
procedures involves weighing the need of law enforcement officers
to obtain evidence against the invasion of individual privacy. The
sort of privacy invasion implicated by gaining access to DNA
profiling information goes beyond simple physical invasion and
thus deserves heightened protection.
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that what
determines "reasonableness" and what constitutes a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" may vary according to the context,
"depending upon the competing considerations at the heart of the
issue." 41 This proposition was stated by Wilson]. in R. v. McKinlay
Transport Limited:
The standard of review of what is "reasonable" in a given
context must be flexible if it is to be realistic and
meaningful. 42

In light of the relative infancy of the legislation (and the
subsequent absence of case law), the standard of what constitutes a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" has not been determined under
the DNA provisions of the Criminal Code. However, the comments
of Dickson C.J.C. in R. v. Simmons4 3 point to a higher standard of
constitutional protection for severe intrusions of bodily integrity:
[T]he greater the intrusion, the greater must be the
justification and the greater the degree of constitutional
protection. 44

39 Supra note 34 at 108. It has since been determined that this assessment must be
made in the light of the totality of the circumstances of a particular case. See e.g. R.
v. Colarusso, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20 at 54 and R. v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 at 62.
40 Although the state may only intend to seize evidence that would identify the
suspect as the perpetrator of the crime, the police are in fact seizing the medical,
racial, ethnic and genealogical history of the suspect as well.
41 R. v. Bernshaw, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 254 at 305.
4 2 (1990), 76 C.R. (3d) 283 at 298 (S.C.C.).
43 (1988), 66 C.R. (3d) 297 (S.C.C.).
44 Ibid at 314.
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In light of the invasive nature of a DNA seizure and the intimate
details of an individual's private life that a genetic profile may
reveal, it is suggested that this mandates a heightened protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures under section 8.
In order to determine the constitutional validity of a search or
seizure, the Supreme Court of Canada stipulated in Hunter that
three requirements must be satisfied: (1) where "feasible" prior
authorization is a "precondition for a valid search and seizure;"45 (2)
the person authorizing the breach of privacy must make the
assessment "in an entirely neutral and impartial manner;" 46 and (3)
there must be reasonable and probable grounds established upon
oath to believe that an offence has been committed or that evidence
will be found at the place of the search.47
Application of these standards to the DNA provisions of the
Criminal Code reveals that the legislation has been carefully drafted
to meet these standards. First, the law provides that a bodily
substance can only be obtained for DNA testing pursuant to a
warrant. 48 Second, an application for a DNA warrant may not be
entertained by a justice of the peace: the legislation mandates that a
warrant may only be issued by a provincial court judge. 49 Third, the
judge may only grant a warrant if he or she is satisfied on oath that
there are reasonable grounds to believe the person to be tested was a
party to the offence. The issuing judge must also deem that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that analysis of bodily substances
will provide probative evidence confirming or disproving the
suspect's involvement in the commission of the offence.5°
The gravity of the offence will have a significant bearing on the
balancing of law enforcement and individual privacy interests under
section 8 of the Charter. The more serious the offence, the more
compelling the societal interest in detection and prosecution of the
offender.
The government could attempt to establish that the seizure of
bodily substances is reasonable by pointing to the fact that the new

45 Supra note 34 at 109.
46 Ibid. at 110.
47 Ibid. at 115.
48 Supra note 4 at s.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.

487.05.
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warrant is only available in connection with certain designated
Criminal Code offences enumerated in section 487.04. These are,
for the most part, serious offences involving violence or injury to the
person, including homicides, sexual offences, assaults and arson.51
However, it should be noted that the Charter gives preference
to the right of the individual to be free from state intervention over
the interests of the state in advancing its purposes through such
interference. The comments of Dickson J. are significant:
DNA

An assessment of the constitutionality of a search and
seizure, or a statute authorizing a search or seizure, must
focus on its "reasonable" or "unreasonable" impact on the
subject of the search or the seizure, and not simply on its
rationality in furthering some valid government
objective. 52

Section 487.07(1)(e) appears to tip the balance strongly in
favour of the state. This provision authorizes a peace officer to use
"as much force as is necessary" for the purpose of executing the
warrant where there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe
that a person is implicated in a serious offence.
Ir may be argued that even with respect to physical integrity,
there comes a point where one's reasonable expectation of privacy,
to remain reasonable, must yield to the state's intrusion. However,
as Lamer J. (as he then was) stated in R. v. Pohorets!ey,5 3 "a violation
of the sanctity of a person's body is much more serious than that of
his office or even his home."54
Following the judgment of Mr. Justice Lamer in R. v. Collins,55
a search or seizure is considered unlawful if carried out with
"unnecessary violence."5 6 In allowing a peace officer to use "as much
force as is necessary" to execute a DNA warrant, it is suggested that
the new legislation infringes section 8 of the Charter.

5I The restriction on the availability of the new DNA warrant seems to indicate
that non-consensual seizures of bodily substances are only justifiable in connection
with offences of a particular nature and gravity. See e.g. R.M. Pomerance, "Bill C104: A Practical Guide to the New DNA Warrants" (1995) 39 C.R. (4th) 224.
52 Supra note 34 at 106.
53 [1987] l S.C.R. 945.
54 Ibid. at 949.
55 (1987), 33 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
56 Ibid. at 15.
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2. Section 7

Section 7 of the Charter states:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof, except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.57

The Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted section 7
broadly, such that it is now clear that it includes the review of the
substance of legislation and guarantees far more than procedural
fairness.5 8 Section 7 has become perhaps the most powerful vehicle
for the establishment of new protections for the accused in criminal
law and will likely have a significant impact on the DNA provisions
of the Criminal Code.
The wording of section 7 indicates that a two-step analysis is
called for in determining whether an action of the state can be
challenged. La Forest J. expressed this notion as follows in R. v.
Beare:
The analysis of section 7 of the Charter involves two steps. To trigger its operation there must be a finding
that there has been a deprivation of the right to "life,
liberty and security of the person" and, secondly, that the
deprivation is contrary to the principles of fundamental
justice. 59

In the context of the recent amendments to section 487 of the
Criminal Code, an individual will likely have little difficulty in
advancing a section 7 challenge by pointing to a threat to his or her
liberty interest. 60 In the case of Reference re Section 94(2) of the
Motor Vehicle Act, 61 Lamer J. (as he then was) stated that the right
to liberty will be violated by the mere potential of imprisonment:

57

Supra note 33 at s. 7.

ss Reference re Section 94(2) ofthe Motor Vehicle Act (1985), 23 C.C.C. (3d) 289
(S.C.C.).
59 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387 at 401.
60 A potential Charter challenge could also be launched on the basis of an
infringement of the right to security of the person. See e.g. R. v. Morgentaler (1988),
62 C.R (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
61 Supra note 58. The most detailed discussion of the right to liberty under s. 7 is
in the recent case of Re Sheena B. (1995), 176 N.R. 161 (S.C.C.).
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Obviously, imprisonment (including probation orders)
deprives persons of their liberty. An offence has that
potential as of the moment it is open to the judge to
impose imprisonment. There is no need that
imprisonment ... be made mandatory. 62
All of the offences enumerated in section 487.05 carry sanctions
that include imprisonment. Therefore, it is clear that the new
legislation presents a threat to the liberty interests of individuals
who are the subjects of DNA warrants.
The second step of the section 7 analysis-determining whether
the deprivation of life, liberty, or security of the person is contrary
to the principles of fundamental justice-has received significant
attention from courts in sketching out the contents of the phrase
"principles of fundamental justice."
In the case of R. v. Woolley, 63 the Ontario Court of Appeal held
that the right of a suspect or accused to remain silent is a wellestablished tenet of our legal tradition. It follows that "the
protection given by this principle must come within the purview of
section 7 of the Charter." 64 The comments of Cory J.A. (as he then
was) are relevant:
It has always been a tenet of our legal system that a
suspect or accused has a right to remain silent at the
investigative stage of the criminal process and at the trial
stage. At the very least, it is clear that an accused person
is under no legal obligation to speak to police authorities
and there is no legal power in the police to compel an
accused to speak.65

It is suggested that evidence obtained pursuant to forensic DNA
analysis has the effect of "speaking" for the suspect or accused, due
to the unique informational characteristics of DNA. The logical
extension of this argument is that by compelling the suspect or
accused to provide a bodily substance, the state is effectively
forcing the individual to give evidence against himself or herself.
Thus by providing a DNA sample, an individual essentially

62

Ibid.

at 311.

64

Ibid.

at 539.

63 (1988), 40 c.c.c. (3d) 531.
65 Ibid.
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relinquishes his or her right to silence. This is tantamount to a
Charter infringement of a most serious nature.
It is settled law that the scope of the right of a detained person
to silence is confirmed by reference to other related rights:
The rights of a person involved in the criminal process are
governed by ss. 7-14 of the Charter. They are
interrelated: Reference re section 94(2) of Motor Vehicle
Act, supra. It must be assumed that the framers of the
Charter intended that they should be interpreted in such
a manner that they form a cohesive and internally
consistent framework for a fair and effective criminal
process. For this reason, the scope of a fundamental
principle of justice under section 7 cannot be defined
without reference to other rights enunciated in this
portion of the Charter as well as the more general
philosophical thrusts of the Charter. 66

The most important of these related rights is the right to
counsel under subsection lO(b) of the Charter. The importance of
this right is stated by McLachlin J. in R. v. Hebert: 67
The most important function of legal advice upon
detention is to ensure that the accused understands his
rights, chief among which is his right to silence .... Read
together ss. 7 and lO(b) confirm the right to silence and
shed light on it.

The amendments to section 487 of the Criminal Code make no
mention of the right of an adult suspect to retain and instruct
counsel prior to the execution of a DNA warrant. This stands in stark
contrast to the special rights explicitly conferred upon young
persons. 68

66 R. v.
67 Ibid.

Hebert (1990), 57 C.C.C. (3d) 1at34-35 (S.C.C.).

at 35.
The definition of "young person" ins. 487.04 of the Criminal Code has the
same meaning assigned by subsection 2(1) of the Young Offenders Act, which states:
"'Young person' means a person who is or, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, appears to be twelve years of age or more, but under eighteen years of age
and, where the context requires, includes any person who is charged under this Act
with having committed an offence while he was a young person or is found guilty of
an offence under this Act." See e.g. Pomerance, supra note 51 at 233-234.
68
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Following the maxim of expressio unis est exclusio alterius,69 it
may be argued that the mention of the right to counsel for young
persons without the explicit recognition of the same right for
adults, excludes adults from this constitutional guarantee.
Subsection lO(b) of the Charter dictates that a person from whom a
bodily substance is collected is required to be informed of his or her
right to counsel, and afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise
that right. Thus, the new legislation may be challenged due to its
unreasonable impact on adults.
Depending on the circumstances, it may be argued that the
presence and assistance of counsel at the time of the execution of
the warrant would have little impact on the position of the accused.
However, given the stability of DNA in hair, blood and saliva, there
is no need to proceed expeditiously with a search. The presence of
counsel is necessary in order to inform the suspect of his or her
constitutionally guaranteed rights, most importantly, the right to
remain silent. To this extent, the suspect should be afforded a full
opportunity to retain and instruct counsel notwithstanding that this
might delay the execution of the warrant.
Where the subject matter of a Charter challenge appears to be
covered by one of the specific protections in sections 8 to 14, an
alternative argument may be advanced under section 7. The
strongest authority for this proposition is the unanimous decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Hebert.7° The Court held
that a pre-trial right to silence is a principle of fundamental justice
protected under section 7, even though protection against selfincrimination was expressly declared in sections 11 (c) and 13.
The decision in Hebert71 is consistent with the earlier ruling in
Thomson Newspapers Ltd v. Canada, 72 which concerned a challenge
to a power under the Combines Investigations Act73 to compel
testimony under oath. Although there was no majority opinion as
to whether section 7 had been violated, all five justices who
presided over the case recognized that section 7 could provide

69 A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another.
70 Supra note 66.

7l

Jbid.

n (1990), 76 C.R. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.).
73

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34.
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wider protection against self-incrimination than afforded in sections
11 (c) and 13. In this way, it is suggested that the new legislation
violates the Charter.

3. Section 1
It is reasonable to propose that the amendments to section 487 of
the Criminal Code may violate the constitutional rights guaranteed
by sections 7 and 8 of the Charter. However, the operation of
section 1 makes it clear that these guaranteed rights and freedoms
are not absolute. Rather, they are subject "to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society. "74
The authoritative blueprint for justifying limitations on Charter
rights under section 1 was established by the Supreme Court of
Canada in R. v. Oakes. 75 The onus of proving that a limitation on a
Charter right is reasonable rests upon the party seeking to uphold
the limitation on a preponderance of probabilities.
The Court asserted that two criteria must be satisfied: (1) the
objective of the limit must be of sufficient importance to warrant
overriding a constitutionally-protected right or freedom; and (2)
the means must be reasonable and demonstrably justified, in
proportion to the importance of the objective. A limit will be
proportional where the measure is carefully designed to achieve the
objective, the right is impaired as little as possible, and there is
proportionality between the effects of the limiting measure and the
objective.
The determination of whether or not the new legislation will
pass the initial stage of the Oakes test will depend upon the
characterization of the objective. The government will likely
attempt to characterize the objective of the legislation as broadly as
possible. Examples could include the enhancement of "community
safety" or the "preservation of the peaceful character of our
society."7 6 It is probable that a court will find that the objective
relates to concerns that are pressing and substantial in a free and
democratic society, thus necessitating the second part of the Oakes
analysis.
74 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] l S.C.R. 295.
75

(1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 (S.C.C.).
note 3.

76 Supra
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Assuming that a sufficiently important objective has been
established, the means chosen to achieve the objective must pass a
three-pronged proportionality test. The first part of the analysis
states that the means chosen must be "rationally connected" to the
objective. Constitutional jurisprudence since Oakes has illustrated
that a relatively low standard is applied at this stage of the test. The
amendments to section 487 of the Criminal Code do not appear to
be arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations, thus, it is
likely that a court will find a "rational connection."
The second step in the proportionality test involves an
assessment of whether the right or freedom is minimally impaired.
Experience has demonstrated that courts will likely focus their
attention on this part of the analysis.
There are several ways Parliament could attempt to establish
that the legislation impairs Charter rights as little as possible: first, a
number of statutory pre-conditions must be satisfied before the
warrant may issue;7 7 second, the warrant must be executed in
compliance with certain, prescribed procedures;7 8 third, the
legislation places strict limitations on the use which may be made of
a sample obtained under a DNA warrant; 79 and fourth, the new law
mandates the destruction of bodily substances and test results in
certain designated circumstances. 80
First, subsection 487.05(1) enumerates a number of statutory
pre-conditions which must be satisfied prior to obtaining a DNA
warrant. The legislation provides that a provincial court judge must
be satisfied (by information on oath) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that: (a) a designated offence has been
committed; (b) a bodily substance has been found; (c) a person was
a party to the offence; and (d) forensic DNA analysis of a bodily
sample from the person will provide evidence about whether the
bodily substance found at the crime scene was from the subject of
the warrant. In addition to these matters, subsection 487.05(1) also
directs the issuing judge to consider whether the warrant is in the
best interests of the administration of justice. Thus, a judge must be
satisfied that the warrant will assist law enforcement officers in

77 Supra note 4 at s. 487.05.
Ibid at s. 487.07.
Ibid at s. 487.08.
80 Ibid. at s. 487.09.
78

79
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determining whether the sample found at the scene of the crime
was deposited by the person believed to be a party to the offence. 81
Second, the government could argue that an individual's
Charter rights are minimally impaired, as the legislation provides
clear rules which direct when a person's privacy can be violated.
Section 487.07 lists a number of statutory procedures which govern
the execution of a DNA warrant. First, subsection 487.07(1) requires
that the suspect must be informed of several matters prior to the
execution of the warrant: (a) the contents of the warrant; (b) the
nature of the investigative procedure to be carried out; (c) the
purpose of obtaining a bodily sample; (d) the possibility that the
results of forensic DNA analysis may be used in evidence; and (e) the
authority of those executing the warrant to use as much force as is
necessary. 82 Subsection 487.07(2) authorizes the detention of an
individual for the time period reasonably necessary to obtain the
bodily substance. Further, subsection 487.07(3) mandates that
those executing the warrant ensure that the privacy of the subject is
respected in a manner that is reasonable in the circumstances. By
explicitly enumerating these requirements, the government could
argue that the new legislation impairs Charter rights as little as
possible.
Conversely, the subject of the warrant could argue that the new
legislation lacks sufficient safeguards to ensure that a search or
seizure is reasonable. This would result in the law going beyond the
minimal impairment of an individual's Charter rights. The recent
amendments to the Criminal Code are silent in at least three areas. 83
First, the amendments to section 487 of the Criminal Code do
not stipulate that the seizure of a bodily substance should be carried
out in private. The execution of a DNA warrant in a crowded
workplace, classroom, or public area, in front of an individual's coworkers, classmates, or friends could result in irreparable damage to
a person's reputation. Thus, the seizure should be carried out in a
private room, not accessible to public view.
Pomerance, supra note 51 at 230.
Further, if the subject of the warrant is a "young person," greater protection is
afforded. In addition to the matters enumerated above, a young person must be
given a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel, a parent, or any other
appropriate adult chosen by the young person and to have the warrant executed in
the presence of such person.
83 Pomerance, supra note 51 at 235.
SI
82
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Second, the law does not mandate that the procedure for
obtaining a bodily substance should be performed under sanitary
conditions. If the seizure takes place in an unclean environment, the
sample may become contaminated, or the subject of the warrant
may suffer an infection, especially if blood is drawn.
Third, the new provisions do not specify that the collection of
samples should be carried out in accordance with approved
scientific guidelines. The recent 0. J. Simpson trial illustrates some
of the problems that may arise when genetic evidence is not
properly gathered. Following approved scientific guidelines would
be consistent with subsection 487.05(l)(d) which provides that a
provincial court judge must be satisfied that the forensic DNA
analysis will provide evidence about whether the bodily substance
found at the crime scene was from the subject of the warrant. This
pre-condition cannot be met unless proper collection procedures are
followed.
It may be argued that Parliament has attempted to remedy
these deficiencies by the inclusion of subsection 487.06(2) in the
legislation. This provision directs the issuing judge to impose "any
terms and conditions which he or she considers advisable to ensure
that the search process is reasonable." These will vary from case to
case, according to the circumstances; however, in light of the
intrusive nature of the seizure, consideration of human dignity and
bodily integrity demand greater procedural safeguards than simply
a discretionary power that may or may not be exercised.
A third argument that the current legislation minimally impairs
individuals' Charter rights is that the law places strict limits on the
use which may be made of bodily substances and the results of
forensic testing obtained pursuant to a DNA warrant.
Subsection 487.08(1) provides that a bodily substance may only
be tested in the course of an investigation of a "designated offence,''
that is, the offence in respect of which the warrant was obtained.
Further, subsection 487.08(2) stipulates that the results of DNA
testing may not be used, except in the course of an investigation of
the designated offence or in the investigation of any other
designated offence in which a warrant was issued or a bodily
substance was found. However, subsection 487.08(2) appears to
encompass the use of forensic DNA analysis in the investigation of a
designated offence other than that specified in the warrant. Thus,
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the new legislation has the potential to go beyond the minimal
impairment of an individual's Charter rights.
A final argument that could be advanced on behalf of the
government is that the new legislation mandates the destruction of
bodily samples and test results in certain designated circumstances.
Subsection 487.09(1) calls for the destruction of a bodily substance
and the results of forensic DNA testing after (a) the results of DNA
analysis establish that the crime scene sample did not come from
the person tested; (b) the person is finally acquitted of the
designated offence; or (c) upon expiration of one year after a
discharge, withdrawal, or stay, unless proceedings have been
recommended within that period.
Despite the apparent protection of individuals' privacy rights
given by subsection 487.09(1), a sweeping exception is created in
subsection 487.09(2). This provision gives a provincial court judge a
discretionary power to make an order preserving the bodily
substance and the results of forensic DNA analysis for an indefinite
period of time.
Further, it should be noted that the legislation does not provide
for the destruction of seized samples in the event that a guilty
verdict is rendered. This means that the samples and results may be
kept for some unknown future use.
In summary, the government could argue that the seizures
authorized under the new legislation are constitutionally sound.
The new law is premised on a model of prior judicial authorization,
and incorporates several safeguards which ensure that seizures
comply with the Charter. 84 While the objective of enhancing the
criminal justice system is laudable, the state cannot pursue this goal
in a vacuum; clearly, there must be respect for individual liberties.
It is evident that the government went to great lengths in an
attempt to make this legislation constitutional; however, the serious
nature of the intrusion demands greater procedural safeguards in
order to ensure that an individual's rights are minimally impaired.
Thus, the DNA provisions of the Criminal Code are likely to fail the
second stage of the proportionality test set out in Oakes.
Furthermore, even if a court finds that the legislation satisfies the
first two elements of the proportionality test, it is suggested that

84 Ibid. at

244.

232

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

due to the serious effects on individuals, the measures will not be
justified by the purposes they are intended to serve. 85

4. Section 24(2)
Section 24(2) provides:
Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court
concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that
infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed
by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is
established that having regard to all the circumstances,
the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. 86

Under the current statutory scheme, it may be possible to argue
for the exclusion of DNA evidence on the ground that it may bring
the administration of justice into disrepute. In R. v. Collins, 87 the
Supreme Court of Canada stated that three factors should be
considered in determining whether evidence should be excluded:
(1) the effect of the admission of the evidence on the fairness of the
trial; (2) the seriousness of the Charter violation; and (3) the effect
that excluding the evidence would have on the repute of justice.
Absent factual evidence, it is impossible to predict the impact of
subsection 24(2) on the new legislation. However, it should be
noted that Canada's highest court has stated that "[t]he use of selfincriminating evidence obtained following a denial of the right to
counsel will, generally, go to the fairness of the trial and should
generally be excluded."88
The present legislation does not afford adults the opportunity
to retain and instruct counsel prior to the execution of a DNA
warrant. In light of the fact that DNA evidence has the effect of
"speaking" for the suspect or accused, situations will invariably arise
whereby self-incriminating evidence is gathered following a denial
of the right to counsel. This evidence will go to the very fairness of
the trial and should therefore be excluded.

85

Supra note 75.
Supra note 33 at s. 24(2).
87 Supra note 55 at 19-20.
88 Ibid at 20.
86
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IV. DNA DATA BANKS
A much greater threat to the constitutional rights of Canadians
comes in the form of DNA data banks. "DNA banking" refers to the
storage and dissemination of information derived from bodily
substances.
On September 20, 1994, the Department of Justice released a
consultation paper entitled, "Obtaining and Banking DNA Forensic
Evidence." 8 9 This document was influential in the drafting of the
present law.
The study recommends the enactment of additional legislation,
governing the creation and regulation of DNA data banks. Thus, the
current law may be simply the "first step in what may become a
more comprehensive statutory scheme." 90 While the following
comments are purely speculative (in light of the absence of
legislation), they nonetheless raise some interesting issues of
constitutional law that merit discussion.
A significant advantage of DNA data banks would be the
clarification of the existing legislation. As the law presently stands,
it is unclear how law enforcement officers are to proceed when they
wish to use a suspect's DNA profile, obtained pursuant to a DNA
warrant, in investigating other unsolved crimes.
One possibility would involve obtaining a new DNA warrant in
connection with the unsolved offences. However, this step would
necessitate the collection of another bodily substance from the
suspect, an intrusion which is unnecessary, given that a substance has
already been collected and tested. This approach is also undesirable
on the basis that it forces duplication of laboratory procedures, thus
placing a strain on scarce resources. It may be argued that the
creation of a DNA data bank will obviate the need for a second
bodily intrusion. This would be consistent with the best interests of
the administration of justice called for in subsection 487.05(1).
Proponents of genetic technology also point to the utilization of
DNA data banks in situations that arouse public sympathy. Possible
examples include: tracking down serial murderers, finding missing
children, reuniting broken families, and controlling sex offenders.

8 9 Canada, Department of Justice, "Obtaining and Banking
Evidence" (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1994).
90 Pomerance, supra note 51, at 225.

DNA

Forensic

234

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

However, the establishment of a DNA data bank poses an
ominous threat to the rights guaranteed to all Canadians by the
Charter. The potential dangers to civil liberties are described by
Janet C. Hoeffel as follows:
Imagine a society where the government had samples of
tissue and fluid from the entire population on file and a
computerized data bank of each individual's DNA profile.
Imagine then that not only law enforcement officials, but
insurance companies, employers, schools, adoption
agencies, and many other organizations could gain access
to those files on a "need to know" basis or on a showing
that access is "in the public interest." Imagine then that
an individual could be turned down for jobs, insurance,
adoption, health care, and other social services and
benefits on the basis of information contained in her DNA
profile, such as genetic disease, heritage, or someone
else's subjective idea of a genetic "flaw."9 1

The establishment of a DNA data bank is inconsistent with the
notions of privacy, liberty and personal security that exist in
Canadian society. The technology has been available for decades to
assemble a comprehensive data bank of Canadians' fingerprints, an
act which over the years would have substantially contributed to the
solving of crimes, but the government has not taken this drastic
step.
The creation of a DNA data bank will likely violate the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. The mandatory collection of genetic
samples almost certainly will be considered an unreasonable search
or seizure under section 8 and will probably constitute a breach of
the section 7 right to life, liberty, and security of the person.
V. CONCLUSION
The benefits that DNA typing provide to law enforcement are
enormous. However, forensic DNA analysis has the potential to raise
a number of sensitive privacy issues, due to the far-reaching
information which can be extracted from a DNA sample.9 2 Certain
provisions of the new legislation reflect these concerns insofar as
9l
92

Supra note 6 at 533-534.
Ibid.
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they seek to safeguard against inappropriate infringements of an
individual's privacy rights. The soundness of this objective cannot
be disputed, however, the measures chosen by Parliament may, in
practice, prove to be less than ideal.
Despite the recent passage of the legislation and the lack of case
law dealing specifically with the new provisions, it should be noted
that the Supreme Court of Canada has already made explicit
reference to statutory schemes involving the mandatory seizure of
bodily substances.
In R. v. Borden, 93 Iacobucci]., writing on behalf of five of the
seven justices who participated in the decision, stated that a
statutory scheme whereby the police can demand a blood sample
may raise Charter concerns.9 4 In light of the fact that the
composition of the Supreme Court has not changed since this
judgment was rendered, this decision acts as a persuasive indication
of how Canada's highest court is likely to regard the statutory
provisions in the new legislation.
The erosion of the rights of the criminal suspect through the
unrestrained use of scientific technology (such as DNA profiling)
threatens the very foundations of a free and democratic society. We
must not allow our enthusiasm over advances in forensics to
overshadow principles of justice or the integrity of the individual.
This technological innovation must be handled carefully if it is to
fit into the societal vision created by the Charter.
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